Our site runs on donations to keep it running for free. Please consider donating if you enjoy your experience here!


Below readers can post in the comments section items they believe are important to seen right away by all other readers.

For instance if we are not at our computer and a reader spots a new issue being issued they can post it below where others can come for ‘breaking news’ from other readers.

We want to keep this page ‘fresh’ so we will slick it off every 50 days so the items below remain only newer items.

We only ask that comments beyond the breaking news be kept to other pages or this page will be ‘out of control’ and not fulfilling what I hope is a handy alert page.


1,200 thoughts on “READER INITIATED ALERTS”

  1. FYI got position in CGDBL this morning ; some at 25.40 and 25.25; volume pretty good; 55k ; with current yield over 8% imho will consistently trade higher once the investing public finds out

  2. I got in today at 25.23 and the volume is 66K as we speak. that makes the current yield 8.17%; IMHO this issue will trade much higher once the investing public finds it ;

    1. People got a little too eager beaver chasing early for a potential 2 year bond. I just bought a small amount at 25.25.

      1. I thought you were a BDC hater, Grid……. Flip potential and boredom get the best of you??? lol

        1. I dont like em, you are correct! I dont like push mowing my lawn either, but I still do it, ha. I am just trying to move things around a bit. Sold off some bonds I have held for a year or two that kept me out of trouble. Using proceeds for shorter duration higher yield, and roached out IG fixed perpetuals way under par.

          1. Grid, Carlyle is a 760 mill market cap. and not a under par 10.00 stock. New Mountain is a 1.3 B market cap and the common is not a subpar stock either.
            I think either note is worth the risk. Especially if you can flip a couple times and get your cost down then hold for 5yrs
            Yes I picked up some at 25.25 today.

            1. Additionally for me Charles, DBRS rating agency is no Egan Jones. So the BBB appears realistic. I have 400 but its more an is what is thing to me. It could be gone in 2 years. That 2 year early call likely will keep price from running away too far.

              1. My concern is the market has been pretty Goldilocks past couple weeks. I can see even the dividend investors here getting excited. But what happens if we have a market stumble? I can see these dropping slightly below par on a panic sell off. I am happy to keep some dry powder just in case. Most of the chatter on that other site is greedy people talking up the yields on the BDC’s common.

                1. With this kind of issue market stuff is just noise. Being it has 2/5 year max duration. And if it blows up at that point it doesnt really matter what price you paid for it. Im being more aggressive lately in a few buying pockets. But I am coming from a situation where over half my money is in CDs/Tbills/IBonds. This gives me a little backstop to buy issues at 20 year lows now.

              2. Grid, for clarification, you bought the New Mountain baby bond? That and the Carlyle preferred are getting intermingled in the comment stream. I passed on both and picked up NS-B a hair under par today, goes ex-div this week.

                1. Furcal, I bought CGBDL the Carlyle 8.2% baby bond. I saw NS-B dip today, but I already have probably too much in a couple NS issues already, ha.

  3. PCF – High Income Securities Fund – Vote on conversion from CEF to open end mutual fund

    Anyone following this one? Shareholders are being asked to vote on a proposal to convert from a closed end fund to an open end. Given it’s been consistently trading at about a 15% discount to NAV, it seems awfully tempting to vote for the proposal… Anyone have a strong opinion?


    What is this proposal?

    Shareholders will have the opportunity to vote at the meeting on the question of whether the Fund should be converted from a closed-end fund to an open-end fund. If the conversion is approved, the Fund’s shares would become redeemable directly from the Fund at NAV, eliminating any discount of market price to NAV. In order to address the organizational changes necessitated by any conversion from closed-end to open-end status, approval of this proposal would also authorize the Trustees to make such amendments to the Fund’s Amended and Restated Agreement and Declaration of Trust (the “Declaration of Trust”) as they may deem necessary or appropriate, generally with a view to conforming the Fund’s Declaration of Trust to a form typically used by open-end funds.

    Why is this question being submitted to shareholders?

    As described further below, as a closed-end fund, the Fund’s shares are bought and sold in the securities markets at prevailing prices, which may be equal to, less than, or greater than its NAV per share. The Fund’s Declaration of Trust requires that shareholders of the Fund be given the opportunity to vote on a proposal to convert the Fund from closed-end to open-end status if the fund’s common shares have traded at an average discount of more than 10% from its NAV per share during the last twelve calendar weeks of the preceding fiscal year (measured as of the last trading day in each such week). The average discount from NAV per share at which the Fund’s shares traded for the relevant period was 13.06%, requiring this proposal to be submitted to shareholders.

    What do the Trustees recommend?

    The Trustees of the Fund make no recommendation regarding this proposal. In determining to make no recommendation regarding this proposal, the Board considered that, as noted above, its inclusion as a proposal at the Meeting is required by the terms of the Fund’s Declaration of Trust. The Trustees believe that each shareholder should determine how to vote with respect to this proposal.

    Are any changes to the Fund currently being contemplated by the Trustees?

    The Board is currently contemplating several potential changes to the Fund which the Board believes will, among other things, increase the Fund’s flexibility to pursue attractive investment opportunities and potentially decrease the discount at which the Fund’s shares trade to NAV. In September 2023, the Board established a Strategic Planning Committee to consider, among other things, what, if any, fundamental changes in the Fund’s structure and investment restrictions are warranted. The Strategic Planning Committee will consider engaging an investment adviser that has demonstrated success in using activist measures to enhance the value of its clients’ investments to manage the assets of the Fund and will also review the Fund’s investment parameters to determine whether they should be expanded. One possible expansion would be to increase the Fund’s exposure to special purpose acquisition companies (“SPACs”) (a/k/a blank check companies), which has the potential to provide a significantly higher return than a money market fund with minimal risk of incurring a realized loss of principal, provided that, as is the Fund’s practice, the common stock is sold or redeemed before a transaction with an operating company is completed as shares of SPACs held after a completed transaction can be very volatile. Currently, the Fund must invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets in fixed income securities (including debt instruments, convertible securities and preferred stock) rated below investment grade (e.g., below BBB/Baa). As a result, the Fund has had to forgo some attractive investments in rated debt instruments. Another possible change would be to increase the Fund’s ability to prudently use leverage to enhance its returns. Currently, the Fund may only use limited leverage on a temporary basis. In the near future, we expect to ask stockholders to vote on proposals to broaden the Fund’s investment parameters, authorize the use of leverage, and engage an investment adviser that has demonstrated success in using activist measures to enhance the value of its clients’ investments. These proposed changes contemplate that the Fund will remain a closed-end fund and the Board will reconsider pursuing them if the proposal to convert the Fund to an open-end investment company is approved by the shareholders.
    What are differences between a closed-end and an open-end fund?

    Shareholders evaluating this proposal may wish to consider the following:

    Traded on Open Market. The common shares of the Fund are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, meaning that shareholders are able to trade their shares freely throughout the day in response to their individual needs and market developments. The price at which shares of an open-end fund may be purchased or redeemed is determined once daily, typically at the close of business.

    Transaction costs (relating to sales and redemptions). As a closed-end fund, the Fund has a stable pool of capital, and does not experience the cash flows associated with sales and redemptions of open-end fund shares. Such cash flows can create transaction costs that are borne by long-term shareholders. These transaction costs include the costs associated with buying securities following shareholder subscriptions into the fund and the costs associated with selling securities to meet shareholder redemptions.

    Assets at work. Because it is a closed-end fund, the Fund’s shares are not redeemable like an open-end fund’s shares. As a result, the Fund is not required to hold cash and/or short-term, lower-yielding investments in anticipation of possible redemptions, and generally can be more fully invested in securities that the Investment Committee believes are appropriate for the Fund. In addition, because the Fund is not engaged in a continuous offering of shares like an open-end fund, it is not required to accept cash subscriptions that may require temporary investment in cash and/or short-term, lower-yielding investments, pending investment in securities that the Investment Committee believes are appropriate for the Fund.

    Flexibility with respect to “illiquid” securities. Because they are required to maintain the ability to honor redemption requests, open-end funds are prohibited by the 1940 Act from investing more than 15% of their assets in securities that are deemed illiquid. Closed-end funds such as the Fund are not subject to this restriction.

    Annual shareholder meetings. The Fund is currently required by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange to hold annual meetings of shareholders. Conversion of the Fund to open-end status would result in termination of the Fund’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange, with the result that the Fund would no longer be required to hold annual meetings.


    Redemption fees. If shareholders approve a conversion to open-end status, the Trustees expect to instate a redemption fee for a period of time following conversion with the purpose of at least partly offsetting the transaction costs that may result from significant redemptions of shares. The terms of any redemption fee would be determined at a later time, but the Trustees do not expect that the fee would exceed 2% or be imposed on redemptions for a period of longer than one year following conversion.

    Distribution expenses. If shareholders approve a conversion to open-end status, in order to increase assets, the Trustees would likely consider commencing a continuous offering of shares of the Fund and might also recommend, subject to shareholder approval, that the Fund adopt a distribution plan under Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act, which could be structured to permit distribution fees of up to 0.50% of net assets.

    What changes will be made to the Fund’s Declaration of Trust if shareholders vote to convert the fund to open-end status?

    Effect on the Fund’s Declaration of Trust. Conversion of the Fund from a closed-end to an open-end status would require certain changes to the Fund’s Declaration of Trust and, therefore, a vote in favor of such conversion would also authorize the Trustees to amend the Fund’s Declaration of Trust to reflect such changes. These changes would bring the Fund’s Declaration of Trust in line with those of open-end funds.

    The Declaration of Trust would be amended to require the Fund to purchase all shares offered to it for redemption at a price equal to the NAV of the shares next determined, less any redemption fee or other charges fixed by the Trustees. In addition, to the extent permitted by applicable law, the Fund would be authorized, at its option, to redeem shares held in a shareholder’s account at NAV if at any time a shareholder owned shares in an amount either less than or greater than, as the case may be, an amount determined by the Trustees. Notwithstanding this provision, all shares would be redeemable at a shareholder’s option.

    The Declaration of Trust would also be amended to eliminate certain provisions that relate specifically to the Fund’s closed-end status, such as the conversion provision that has necessitated this proposal. In addition, if shareholders were to vote to convert the Fund to open-end status, the provision in the Fund’s Declaration of Trust requiring that Trustees be elected annually at the annual shareholder meeting or at a special meeting in lieu thereof would be eliminated. The Trustees would also make certain necessary technical and non-material changes to the Declaration of Trust.
    What are other changes that will be made with respect to the Fund if shareholders vote to convert the fund to open-end status?

    12b-1 Plan. As a stand-alone internally-managed closed-end fund, there are no current structures in place for the marketing and distribution of Fund shares. If this proposal is approved by shareholders, to support the marketing of fund shares, the Trustees might also recommend, subject to shareholder approval, that the Fund adopt a distribution plan under Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act. The plan the Trustees might recommend could provide for annual distribution fees of up to 0.50% of net assets.

    Timing. If this proposal is approved by shareholders, a number of steps would be required to implement the conversion, including the preparation, filing and effectiveness of an open-end fund registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, covering the offering of the Fund’s shares (the “Open-End Registration Statement”), the establishment of distribution arrangements, and the negotiation and execution of a new or amended agreement with the Fund’s transfer agent. In addition, subject to any necessary Trustee and shareholder approvals, the Fund, which is currently internally-managed by an Investment Committee, may propose to enter into an investment management agreement with an investment adviser. The Fund anticipates that the conversion would become effective during the third quarter of 2024, although there is no assurance of this, and that the discount, if any, at which the Fund’s shares trade in relation to its NAV would likely be reduced in anticipation of the ability to redeem shares at NAV upon the completion of the conversion. It is expected that the Fund’s amended Declaration of Trust would not be filed and effective until the Open-End Registration Statement has become effective.

    Shareholder Approval of Certain Items. Should the Fund convert to an open-end investment company, certain aspects of the operation of the Fund subsequent to its conversion may need to be approved by the Fund’s shareholders before the effectiveness of the conversion. These matters may include, among other things, entering into an investment management agreement with an investment adviser, making any changes in the Fund’s fundamental investment policies, and considering the adoption of a distribution plan under Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act.

    Portfolio Transitioning. If the proposal to convert to an open-end fund is approved, the Fund’s portfolio of investments will be reviewed to determine whether any changes are necessary to comply with 1940 Act requirements for open-end funds. The Fund anticipates that any required changes would be made in advance of the effective date of the Fund’s conversion to ensure the Fund is in compliance on the effective date. This could result in the Fund disposing of certain investments at inopportune times for unfavorable prices. As noted above, open-end funds are prohibited by the 1940 Act from investing more than 15% of their assets in securities that are deemed illiquid. As of November 14, 2023, approximately 0.5% of the Fund’s portfolio was invested in illiquid securities. Based on the Fund’s portfolio as of November 14, 2023, which is subject to change, there would be no required portfolio transitioning. The costs (including brokerage and tax) of any required portfolio transitioning will be borne by the Fund.
    What are the anticipated costs to the Fund and its shareholders if the proposal to convert to an open-end fund is approved?

    Certain legal, accounting and other costs would be borne by the Fund (and its shareholders) in connection with the conversion of the Fund to open-end status. These direct costs are currently estimated to be between $150,000 to $200,000, although there is no guarantee that the direct costs would fall within this range. These direct costs would be in addition to any portfolio transitioning costs (discussed above) and any ongoing additional redemption and distribution fees (discussed above) that would be incurred by the Fund’s shareholders if the Fund was converted to an open-end fund.

    What is the voting requirement for approving the conversion?

    Approval of the conversion of the Fund to open-end status and of the related amendments to the Fund’s Declaration of Trust requires the “yes” vote of a majority of the Fund’s outstanding shares. If approved, the conversion would become effective following compliance with all necessary regulatory requirements under federal and state law. The Fund would seek to complete this process as soon as reasonably practicable. Until the conversion, the Fund’s shares would continue to be listed and traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

    If the conversion is not approved, will the Fund continue in its current form?

    Yes. In the event that shareholders do not approve the conversion of the Fund to open-end status, the Fund would continue to operate as a closed-end fund and the Board would continue to pursue the changes discussed in response to “Are any changes to the Fund being contemplated by the Trustees?” above.

    The Trustees make no recommendation regarding how the Fund’s shareholders vote with respect to the conversion of the Fund to open-end status at this time.

    1. I had this experience long ago; the closed end fund was “Precious Metal Holdings” it converted to an open-end fund; what happened was; the Sponsor did not actively market the fund, most of the holders bailed out as soon as they could get the NAV, and the Fund closed within six month . I’d say the lesson learned is vote for the conversion and sell as soon as you can. or am I being cynical?

    2. 2WR this is very interesting thanx for pointing it out, I may take a nibble here, they are invested in higher risk things of course but well diversified- and should s/h approve the transition to a mutual fund from CEF, ‘closing’ the gap to NAV assuming NAV holds up ok, means a nice return potential and income until possible completion in 3rd q 2024. As Ted noted I would probably sell personally right before conversion or even after but more on a risk basis and big change in what they want to invest in. If it fails, it is a h/y fund but well diversified (fairly thinly traded overall. )
      Anyway I did ask a question to Stanford Chemist bunch what they thought about it and referenced you on SA not sure they’d reply as they have a ‘service’.. thanx again. We’ll see. Bea

      1. As you’ve probably seen I too had mentioned this to Nick and also to Steve Bavaria (https://seekingalpha.com/article/4652945-how-closed-end-funds-discounts-reduce-my-long-term-risk) to see what their experiences have been…. I was surprised they didnt no more about the proposal already….. In general, unless I missed an earlier request, the notification to vote came in unusually late given the cutoff date… I have to believe that was by design… I suspect they are not going out of their way to make this vote go in favor and that’s evidenced not only by their abstaining but by not giving much time for shareholders to vote… We’ll see… I suspect the odds are not very good that this will pass, so keep that in mind,… I expect to vote in favor, though

  4. Schwab let me place an order- at par for fun, Bid=25.45 ask= 25.80, won’t happen.
    CGBDL too high already

  5. Vanguard allowed me to put in an order, but like Fido, lists bid 25.20 and ask 283 (yes, no decimal)

  6. They must have saved NMFCZ for a Black Friday special. Fidelity still not allowing orders to be placed.

    1. what is the OTCBB symbol ? that yahoo piece didn’t show it ; its not trading under cgbdl; thanks

      1. There is no OTCBB symbol, and it did trade under CGBDL today. It was tradable at Fidelity but not Schwab.

        P.S. NMFCZ is now a valid symbol at Yahoo, so on the basis of 1 datapoint I’m going to say it will trade on Friday.

  7. It did this the last time getting closer to exD in case of call. Im usually getting back in again as I have already dumped several weeks back closer to $26. Trouble is I dont have enough free cash to make it worth my time, as I just bought about tapped myself out buying something else. It is an is what is thing. It will be called or it wont…And down the road one might need to baby sit if Fed starts dropping sometime because of its low relative adjustment.

  8. I own some shares of the RILYO baby bonds at Fidelity. They mature in six months and the YTM is around 15%. The shares are being lent out to short sellers, so I am currently receiving an extra 32.875% interest. Thanks to the short sellers, my total yield is around 48%.

    I know there is a gang of short sellers on Twitter (@AlderLaneEggs, @WolfpackReports, @FriendlyBearSA plus others) that are trying to bring down the company by targeting Riley’s investment portfolio. But the underlying business is generating strong operating profits and Riley insiders have continued buying stock. Hard to see how RILY can go bankrupt in six months.

    1. I was hard to see the bankrupt of SBNY and FRC but they disappeared faster than the blink of an eye. So everything can happen. Just saying

      1. That’s true. But SBNY and FRC were banks and RILY is not. Even if RILY eventually goe bankrupt at some point in the future, for a non-bank the process takes awhile. That is unlike banks which can be shut down over a weekend. That is why I think RILYO is safer than the other RILY baby bonds, although I think all of them will most likely pay off.

      2. That’s true. But SBNY and FRC were banks and RILY is not. Even if RILY eventually goes bankrupt at some point in the future, for a non-bank the process takes awhile. That is unlike banks which can be shut down over a weekend. That is why I think RILYO is safer than the other RILY baby bonds, although I think all of them will most likely pay off.

    2. I’ve added some RILYO to several accounts this week for the same reason. Very little chance they don’t pay this one off and as you stated the YTM is double digits.

      1. To answer my own question, Schwab SLFP is paying 15% on RILYO today (half of their HTB rate).

    3. RILY has got caught in a bear trap with legal issues. Exec’s been playing a bit loose. But I took a small bite of the apple (hopefully not poison) of RILYM as at the time it was a 28% YTM (2/2025).

    4. GS:

      Alder Lane Eggs is Marc Cohodes who is a very good investor and short seller. I would never bet against him. But he certainly could be wrong on RILY common.

      I bought some of the RILYO when it recently traded below $22 but have since sold. Anyone who buys any of the longer maturity RILY baby bonds needs to accept that they may lose their entire investment.

      RILY has basically become a highly leveraged small cap private equity fund with a list of conflicts of interest longer than the Mississippi River. The warnings signs on this company are very obvious.

  9. TPTA and Western Asset aka Franklin getting hitched. I had a post giving the details, but the software has left in in “Limbo”.

    “Terra Property Trust And Western Asset Mortgage Capital Corporation Announced Merger”

    1. LOS ANGELES–(BUSINESS WIRE)– Air Lease Corporation (NYSE: AL) (the “Company”) announced the pricing on November 20, 2023 of its offering of C$500 million aggregate principal amount of 5.400% senior unsecured medium-term notes due June 1, 2028 (the “Notes”). The sale of the Notes is expected to close on November 29, 2023, subject to satisfaction of customary closing conditions.
      The Notes will mature on June 1, 2028and will bear interest at a rate of 5.400% per annum, payable semi-annually in arrears on June 1 and December 1 of each year, commencing on June 1, 2024. Owners of the Notes will receive payments relating to their Notes in Canadian dollars.
      The Company intends to use the net proceeds of the offering for general corporate purposes, which may include, among other things, the purchase of commercial aircraft and the repayment of existing indebtedness.

  10. Just a heads up in case anyone else was following the PacWest saga from earlier this year.

    The votes on PACW’s merger with Banc of California will occur this Wednesday, the 22nd, with the expected close eight days later at the end of the month (give or take).

    PACWP is a 7.75% preferred, fixed at that rate until 2027. At its current price of roughly $21 it’s yielding 9.2%. This merger should take 90% of the risk out of the issue and I think it’s worth a look if you don’t mind a preferred with some hair on it.

    (I own some yes)

    1. I agree , and I got some PACWP at 20.96 the other day, making my own little PGX or PFF if you will, which now w low basis (so far/fingers crossed) includes BWBBP as noted , NYCB-U , CTO.PRA, LXP.PRC, BFS D and E, REXR-C, LBRDP, REGCO.
      The CTOs and BFSs (together if you will) are my top holdings, DYODD, this is what works for me, todays stocks could be tomorrow’s memories in BeaVille. But to be honest I see these in the aggregate as keepers now.

      2.5-4% over cash 5% yields are fine for me to reinvest elsewhere w the income; at 65 now (omg!) w longevity and mom 90 now, sitting in cash aint gonna cut it long term. Thanx to all for the ideas as always and GLTA

  11. I saw this article the other day and wanted to pass it on to interested folks.

    I looks like BCRED (and other PC funds) are converting to CLO equity funds.
    That is my interpretation anyway. Checked the prospectus and yes BCRED can do this, I just think it’s kind of a sneaky way to do it.

    You invest in the fund thinking it’s a credit fund using minimal leverage
    You pay the sales load
    You take the liquidity risk knowing it is a gated fund
    You wake up one day to find out you purchased a CLO equity fund.

    These two paragraphs are noteworthy and should serve as a warning to investors in BCRED and other PC funds. Should serve as a warning, but it won’t:

    “While the $1tn CLO market has long been dominated by structures that buy up loans in the publicly traded leveraged loan market, it has — until recently — not included the kinds of multibillion-dollar loans that private credit fund managers have come to underwrite. ”

    “They are much smaller credits, harder to trade and wrap your head around,” Dan Ko, a portfolio manager at Eagle Point Credit Management, said of middle-market CLOs. “Typically there are non-disclosure agreements required to even see the portfolio . . . Ultimately, it is less transparency in the middle-market space that causes the additional spread.”


    I noted the 2.3% spread on the reported AAA bond tranche. That is interesting something I will keep in mind when looking at callable agency bonds (IMO).


    1. Forgot to add this gem at the end of the article:

      “About a fifth of the loans in the BCRED CLO can be rated triple-C or below by Moody’s, far higher than the 7.5 per cent threshold for broadly syndicated CLOs. The private loans are also far less likely to be traded — by definition there are no public markets for them, and they tend to be owned by just a handful of other investment firms.”

      Sales Fees
      An Illiquid Fund
      Illiquid Assets
      More Credit Risk
      Increasing Leverage
      What’s not to like (sarcasm)?

      1. August I ran it through the Archive site to read the whole article
        Wells Fargo is helping to market the deal.
        I get goosebumps walking past the old graveyard. I remember reading the headstones of the housing crisis. Wall Street saying we are packaging home mortgage loans into new packaging and it will raise credit quality because if a few low credit loans fail the CLO package will survive. Will 1/5th be the magic number?
        Blackstone, Apollo and Ares already know which are the rotten apples and are just trying to re-package their riskier assets to get rid of them but then generate their usual management fee.
        I like the comment by Dan Ko portfolio manager at Eagle point Credit that these CLO’s are harder to trade and understand. Meaning in the event of a crash these new wrap around CLO’s will be impossible to sell.
        That name Blue Owl was mentioned in the article. It keeps popping up and I am seeing that name more and more lately. I think I have seen bonds offered on FIDO with that name.
        Sheep beware,

  12. Looks like SCE-M is trading in the grey market under SCETV. Tradable at Fidelity but not Schwab. Last trade $25.26

    1. Were you able to buy it at Fido online? Says symbol is not valid and won’t let me place a trade.

      1. Thanks, David. Its trading under TD and I bought some. Might buy more once Vanguard gets going. Certainly the weakest by far credit wise of what I own but will view as a trade if it heads north towards $26 or hold if it remains around here. The SCE preferreds do sit structurally above the EIX parent debt.

    2. Not tradeable at Fidelity. Fixed income trader said due to lack of company information. Probably will have to wait until next week, settlement is 11/22.

      1. That’s weird, I was able to place an order, although it didn’t execute. Did you use symbol SCETV?

        1. Great. But still no dice for me. Getting the same error message from last week:

          (009833) The symbol you entered is not a security that is traded by Fidelity. Please verify the symbol and re-enter your order.

          Both ATP and Fido.com.

    3. David –
      I sold my (tiny amount of) SCE-L (yield ~ 6.66) for this SCETV (yield ~ 7.4 )

      It seems to me that one or the other (or both) of these fixed preferreds should reprice to about the same yield.

    4. Not to belabor this, but a Day order worked fine for me on fidelity.com. A market order didn’t work, but there was a clear error message saying to change it to a limit order.

  13. tizod,
    Just my 2 cents. Was hard for me to feel I could do proper research for CCC rated Bonds. BondBloxx (ETF ticker XCCC) to my rescue. They do the work for you. Surprisingly low fee, has even held up well through this mess last yr or so.
    As CCC’s go, Dish looks ok, it’s held by a high dollar ETF that PIMCO runs–with a different higher coupon Dish Bond in its top 10 holdings.
    I have done several Bond & Stock reclamation projects with some success but felt pretty strongly during those, on this I think I would pass because I simply don’t feel that I could learn enough about it to invest.

    1. XCCC seems like an interesting product, but isn’t it based on an unmanaged index? I don’t see where there’s any research being done.

      1. David,
        I definately misspoke there implying others did research. Yes it is an index, the ICE CCC US Cash Pay High Yield Constrained Index. Good catch.

  14. tizod,

    Dish’ ratings: CAA2/CCC+

    Here’s the translation: You’re highly likely to lose all of your investment before the end of 2024.

    If you are a new investor, let us know and ask educational questions (not: “how’s this high-yielder look”). Their are a lot of terrific people here who will provide feedback.

    Here’s one to kick it off: Stop yield-chasing, it is a sure road to failure.

    Here’s another: As a cornerstone, please learn about credit ratings. Spend a lot of time reviwing and understanding Standard and Poor’s experience-ratings.

    Good luck.

    1. In addition to S&P, there is Moody’s. I use both when screening for fixed income investments.

    2. I concur. Buying super junky debt is something I liken to selling naked puts. You might get away with it at first but eventually it will catch up to you. And that loss will be brutal in terms of portfolio performance impact especially if you are not properly position sized and went too big because of the luring yield or premium. Would have been way better off just taking a JPMorgan @ 6%. I’ll do a junk search later and post candidates I think have a better chance.

      Back in 2009-2012, there was a ton of opportunity to be had in junk corps and also especially any perpetuals applicable to the permian basin boom. It was a glorious time; 10%+ coupon preferreds sky rocketing to over par.

      But eventually this ended very badly and similar to this ultimate oil preferred crash what we saw play out is that even though in some instances you could have this incredible valuable commodity buried under the ground; yet if there is not a economically proficient way to extract it from said ground to make a profit, it’s a moot point.

      Related to above, I have lost track now at how many billions and billions of dollars Ergen has pumped into buying spectrum now over a decade plus. And mind you, many of his moves were strategically sound in buying this from other satellite companies that went BK route for pennies on the dollar. He definitely had a vision but unless you can ultimately monetize this one day, bond interest won’t get paid and you won’t be able to keep can kicking your debt down the road. I believe Ergen actually even said more recently their path to financial stability is a very narrow one.

      Remember times are different now; this isn’t the 80s. In a pinch allot of companies will care about as bunch as the bond holders as they do the equity side. They don’t. Push comes to shove and they just file ch 11. blowing out everyone.

      Unless you have legit secured top stacked senior debt, take little comfort as a bond holder in junkier situations. In a recovery situation, it simply won’t matter. Sure maybe you can get 10 cents on the dollar vs. equity side that goes into the abyss but that’s about it.

      1. TNT – That’s an awesome tidbit about your home town! The fact that Charlie had been hoarding up spectrum for easily over a decade and well before anyone and everyone jumped on this band wagon makes him a visionary.

        And that’s a great point you made; merging the two companies truly was the ultra bad tipping point. I think about 3 years ago, he had some real credible leverage against Elon and probably could have unloaded a bunch of his spectrum portfolio for a handsome profit.

      2. yazzer – Most definitely. For folks who can stay laser focused and use naked put selling as a limit buy order tactic, it is a great strategy, especially for stocks that you want to own in your particular allocation.

        But I can’t tell you how many times firsthand I’ve seen people just go off the deep end and chase the high IV plays. Especially with weeklies.

      3. Isn’t each NVDA put the equivalent of 100 shares? Seems like a lot of cash to tie up for such a small gain.

    3. I’m with alpha on this. Wolfstreet has a decent chart titled “Credit Rating Scales by Agency, Long-Term” that was a big help to me when I started working with preferreds and bonds. It covers Moody’s S&P and Fitch, and is still available if you Google it. I encourage printing it out and using it.

  15. MMFs today…

    VUSXX ~ 5.34%
    VMRXX ~ 5.31%
    VMFXX ~ 5.29%
    SWVXX ~ 5.26%
    SNXXX ~ 5.10%
    SNOXX ~ 5.08%
    SPRXX ~ 5.08%
    SPAXX ~ 4.99%

  16. Viceroy Research put out a hit piece on Arbor Realty (ABR) calling them slumlords. Price fell over 9%. Preferreds also down by a lesser amount.
    ABR gets positive reviews by most analysts and an occasional extremely negative report typically by somebody shorting the stock, Does anybody know who to believe?

    1. Don’t know much about ABR but it was selling below $11 back in April. Maybe a short push then?

    2. Viceroy Research is another hack outfit like NINGI who also did a short report on Arbor earlier in the year (in which Arbor disputed the charges). This report is a joke, read it if you want a good laugh and then check out the Wikipedia page on Viceroy Research to see all the past allegations and investigations into them. Also, I am sure it is not a coincidence that they published it on Arbor’s ex date so the don’t have to pay the dividend on any new shorts.

      1. So the big drop is a buying opportunity. Send them a bottle of champagne.
        Retail buyers can be such idiots. And where’s the SEC who is supposed to oversee such obvious shenanigans?

        1. > And where’s the SEC who is supposed to oversee such obvious shenanigans?

          Well, this is the United States and we do have that 1st Amendment. Unless you’re lying and you know (or should’ve known) that you’re lying, you’re allowed to be negative on a stock and tell people that it’s garbage.

      2. rk:

        I wouldn’t call the 29-page report on ABR a joke, but it is littered with extremes like calling the company “slumlords”. (ABR does not even own the apartment properties – they provide the financing).

        But even if one were to completely dismiss the Viceroy report as nonsense, Currently Expected Credit Losses (CECLs) and non-performing loan trends for ABR are concerning. From their 3rd quarter call:

        “During the third quarter of 2023, the Company recorded a $15.0 million provision for loan losses associated with CECL. At September 30, 2023, the Company’s total allowance for loan losses was $184.1 million. (was $132M as of 12/31/22).

        The Company had twelve non-performing loans with a carrying value of $137.9 million, before related loan loss reserves of $12.6 million, compared to seven loans with a carrying value of $122.4 million, before loan loss reserves of $10.1 million at June 30, 2023.”

        There is a ton of new multi-family supply hitting the market over the next 18 months. ABR usually trades at a premium to its tangible book value, but now has traded at a discount for some time.

        FWIW….and DYODD.

    1. Alpha, 15 million customers and only a dozen homes destroyed.
      Buy the dip.
      The Tubbs fire destroyed over 10% of the housing in Santa Rosa Calif.

      1. Received $865.00 in dividends yesterday on my PCG preferred stocks. All bought with a 7-1/2 to 8% yield. Rainy season is here and the stock is safe for another 9 months. My high yield risk play.
        SCE PL bought from 17.00 to 17.50 for a 7% yield to cost, wonder if we will see those prices again.

        1. Gary, Hurricane and Tornado season is over. How many have been killed every year? Doesn’t stop me from buying ute’s although I don’t own anything from Duke or Southern
          News feed off headlines. If you read the filing for the SCE M it mentioned subject to obtaining insurance

          1. Announcement today the California PUC approved a rate increase for PCG to underground high power electric lines. Average cost increase to consumers bill of $40.00 a month. Supports the preferred but the man giveth the dividend then takes it away.

    2. On November 15, 2023, the board of directors of GasLog declared a dividend on GasLog’s 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preference Shares (“GasLog’s Preference Shares”) of $0.546875 per share payable on January 2, 2024, to holders of record as of December 29, 2023.


      1. i’m trying to find out who is the Parent company now to this preferred series GLOP-A,B,C . GLOG does not exist anymore . Exactly who is the entity that bot them out? do they trade on any exchange. Quantum is no help here ; thanks

        1. Ted and/or Ted Scalione:

          You’ve been asking about the GasLog Ltd. and GasLog Partners, LP preferred shares. Here are some links that should help you figure out the answer to your question.
          First, the terms of the GasLog Ltd. / GasLog Partners LP merger agreement:

          https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1598655/000110465923056630/tm2314213d1_ex99-a1.htm (this is a long read, but the authoritative document governing the deal that was approved in August)

          N.B. at page 81 there is a warning of “synergies” and a discussion of potential future delisting of the preferred shares:

          “Simplified Corporate Structure: The Merger enables Parent to reduce the complexity in its organizational structure and is a natural continuation following the take private transaction of Parent, putting Parent in position to potentially achieve additional synergies in the event that the Preference Units (which will continue to trade on the NYSE immediately following completion of the Merger) are *delisted in the future.*” (Emphasis added.)

          For the moment, anyway, both companies are still filing with the SEC:

          * GasLog Ltd. SEC Filings:

          * GasLog Partners, LP SEC Filings:

          Exhibit 99.2 to GasLog Partners’ 6-K (filed yesterday) summarizes the merger at the very beginning of the document:

          Tim, I’m sorry to clutter up the Reader Initiated Alerts area here (I know matters like this should be discussed elsewhere) but it seemed like an appropriate place given the questions about GLOG/GLOP that have been asked lately.

    3. On November 16, 2023, FTAI Aviation Ltd. (“FTAI Aviation” and, together with its consolidated subsidiaries, the “Company,” “we,” “us” or “our”)
      announced that Fortress Transportation and Infrastructure Investors LLC, its subsidiary (the “Issuer”), is commencing an offering of $500.0 million
      aggregate principal amount of senior notes due 2030 (the “Notes”) in a private offering (the “Private Offering”), subject to market and other conditions.
      The Notes will be fully and unconditionally guaranteed on a senior unsecured basis by FTAI Aviation.
      The Issuer intends to use the net proceeds from the Private Offering (i) to repay in full its outstanding borrowings under its revolving credit facility with
      JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as administrative agent, and certain lenders and issuing banks (without any reduction in commitments) and (ii) for general
      corporate purposes, which may include the funding of future acquisitions and investments.

  17. HROW common fell off a cliff today. Down $4.66 as of now, almost a 37% loss in value. The 2 preferred off over a $1.00 a share and holding up better than the common. Last 3 qtrs missed earnings. I do not own any of the preferred and not planning to.

    1. I wonder if that’s sarcasm Troy? Past month I have been reading FDA has asked manufacturers to take 1/2 dozen eye drops off the market due to contamination in the manufacturing process. Nothing about this company I think, just guilt by association. A small company like this doesn’t need a problem. Last 3 quarters hasn’t met sales goals and CEO keeps promising the next quarter will be better. I just happened to see the drop in the stock. I have over 50 holdings to spread out the ups and downs and I don’t need a problem child I have to watch constantly that I can’t see what is going on.
      I take risks with oil and gas and shipping and watch a few stocks related to that part of the economy. But this part of the economy is constantly updating in the news so I can get a feel for what I need to watch out for.
      Harrow is a small obscure company that even if I set a news feed watch to notify me of anything important it could move so quickly I couldn’t react quick enough.

    1. What a great example of the value of III. Everyone here was all over this info pre-announcement and pointed out the seller out there at 98 on 11/8 and I missed it and missed it again at 98.80…. Congrats to all who bot. Power to III!!!

      1. Yes, thanks to III.

        I maxed out on that one at $98. Since the only account I could buy it in was Merrill I used every available dollar in those accounts to load up.

        I had owned a bunch previously as well so those shares also did nicely for me.

  18. Interesting:
    Co-Managers: B Riley, TCG Capital Markets

    An external manager or is this issuance management? – not familiar with it.
    I don’t see them listed as an external manage of the BDC.

  19. New 5yr non-callable CD…

    WFC just listed a non-callable 5yr CD at 5.05%, 11/21/28 ~ 949764HZ0

    1. To go along with that:

      All monthly payers and non-callable CDs:
      WFC – 18 Month, 5.5%
      – 2 Year, 5.35%
      – 3 Year, 5.2%
      – 4 Year, 5.1%

      GS – 1 year, 5.45%

    2. My preference of your two options ~ WFC with fixed monthly payments for 5 years & FDIC backup…

      With the US budget being possibly split up into pieces, who knows which pieces are safer or at risk ~ Las Vegas craps may be the best alternative 🙂

  20. RILY shares down another 21% this morning…goes ex-dividend 11/17 with a 15.6% forward yield. Any takers?

      1. Posts a huge loss, despite declareing sizeable cash dividend, huge drop in price and much higher than average volume. Even the preferreds are down big time. RILYK (matures 2026) down almost $3 ($18.32) and short term marturity (5/31/24) trading well under par at $22.20, all others down. Market not liking this stock at all. Falling knife or opportunity?

  21. I thought yet again we were getting an October 2022 repeat, where we had that violent spike in yields that ultimately wound up being a very short window of time to get in. Before you knew it all our favorite quality high coupon perpetuals were back over par.

    But today thanks to JP’s mid-afternoon no hesitation to hike comment, we got a big spike in 10 year treasury yields amongst other durations along with weak auction results and some of my favorite perpetual yields moving back up EOD.

    This is going to be an interesting time. I still think you have to ear mark some cash for future buying because who knows where this leads.

    Years and years ago now I vividly remember the pure adrenalin and excitement of having bought preferreds in the single digits only to one day have them trading back to near or at par. No greater joy in the world of capitalism and speculation than that.

    1. Tired of JPOW and his power trip games. At least wait till the next meeting before you go shooting your big mouth off. He has no idea what to do. What a horrible Fed head,

      1. Somewhat out of the loop regarding the news with the FRB where I am at. What little I can read is the clock is still ticking on reaching agreements on the national budget even with breaking it up into parts and once again there is a spector of a partial shutdown. You have two sectors of the government that can be completely at odds with each other.

      2. Powell dropped an F-Bomb yesterday. That’s ok because I use that word every time I see his face. Old Hickory.

      3. And just like that…. the following day market disgests what JP said and boom, depsite higher long term rates SPY up 1.5% and ends 1.2% up for the week. Aren’t these more like rates we’ve watched as we grew older? Out of the past 60 years the 10 year has been over 4% for about 75% of those years, and 10 year never dropped below current level from 1962 to 2002, that’s 40 years. Only last 15 years or so were the rates below 4%. We’ve lived through 15% 10 year rates.

    2. >> Years and years ago now I vividly remember the pure adrenalin and excitement of having bought preferreds in the single digits only to one day have them trading back to near or at par. No greater joy in the world of capitalism and speculation than that.

      That was a wild time (2008-09) for acquiring as well as trading preferreds. Banking issues were so volatile that you could sometimes nab a buck or two in hours to days. They were giving money away. I don’t know if my heart could withstand that much adrenaline now :>)

  22. B. Riley (NASDAQ:RILY) is down 27% this week as the head of one of its companies may be facing fraud allegations.

    Brian Kahn, the head of Franchise Group, was named by Bloomberg as a possible co-conspirator in a $294 million fraud case in connection with a co-founder of Prophecy Asset Management. B. Riley invested nearly half a billion dollars this year in Franchise.

    On Wednesday, B. Riley (RILY) CEO Bryant Riley defended its investment and relationship with Kahn as the investment firm reported its Q3 results.

    “I know that today a statement came out from Brian denying any involvement in what happened with Prophecy, and that’s good enough for me,” Riley said on the company’s Q3 earnings conference call on Wednesday. “So I want to just be crystal clear: I believe we are going to make a lot of money for our shareholders in Franchise Group.”

    “We would have bought all of Franchise Group. We are a huge fan of that business and it’s a really simple analysis,” Riley, the founder and chairman of B. Riley, said.

    B. Riley (RILY) shares dropped 22% on Monday following a report Thursday that Kahn was affiliated with Prophecy Asset Management, where the co-founder last week pleaded guilty to defrauding clients of $294 million, according to Bloomberg.

    A representative for Kahn didn’t immediately respond to a phone call and voicemail message from Seeking Alpha for comment.

    In August, Kahn, with help from B. Riley (RILY) and others, led a management-led buyout of Franchise Group, which has businesses including The Vitamin Shoppe, Pet Supplies Plus and American Freight, for about $2.8B. The transaction represented B. Riley’s (RILY) second investment in Franchise Group. The company took an initial investment in Liberty Tax, which eventually became Franchise Group, in 2018.

    The recent share drop in B. Riley (RILY) also comes as the firm has been the target of some short-seller reports this year, including one in February. B. Riley short interest is 24%.

    1. Well, that’s a interesting turn of events. Speaking in his defense, Kahn may have cut the buyout price on the FRG common low, but he did conduct himself honorably and didn’t go-dark the FRG preferreds like the shippers, the PE buyers, the self-dealers etc. usually do, thus avoiding the Preferred Investors Hall of Shame that GMLPF, SJIJ and AFSIA are in.

      1. FRG preferred prospectus clearly stated that if the company was bought out the preferred had a right to convert to common at 1 for 1.9ish and thus.. had to be called at 25 as that was the cheaper option. So I am not sure I would give him a junior woodchuck badge for that.

  23. US Household Debt ~ new record set, 17.3 T in Q3, 2023

    * Mortgage balances ~ 12.2 T
    * Student Loans balances ~ 1.7T
    * Auto Loan balances ~ 1.7T
    * Credit Card balances ~ 1.1T
    * Other Consumer Loan balances ~ 0.6T

    * Aggregate Delinquencies on above ~ currently 3%

    1. I also question some data. Like I want to know how much credit card debt is not paid off each month. After all we use credit cards a lot more now days. So the total amount is hardly useful.

    2. I guess it would be hard to actually determine overall delinquencies when payments for student debts have been legally deferred for so many years. I am sure that 3% delinquency figure is much higher if not for that.

      1. Here is the text>

        US Calls for New Limits to Wall Street Bank Backstop After March Crisis

        Lenders face new limits on Federal Home Loan Bank usage
        Regulator wants more FHLB focus on housing, not failing banks

        By Austin Weinstein
        November 7, 2023 at 5:30 PM UTC

        US officials will seek to limit some access to Federal Home Loan Banks after multiple failing lenders turned to the $1.3 trillion system in desperate bids to survive March’s banking crisis.

        After a review of the system that lasted more than a year, the Federal Housing Finance Agency will move FHLBs away from serving as lenders of last resort for financial firms in turmoil, and back to their roots in housing finance. The plans ratchet up federal oversight and seek to push banks toward the Federal Reserve’s discount window in times of extreme stress, according to a report to be published Tuesday.

        Banks borrow hundreds of billions of dollars from the government-chartered FHLBs each year to fulfill short-term funding needs. The practice came under scrutiny after the FHLBs, which have implied backing from the government, lent heavily to Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank as they careened toward failure.

        Among the major changes, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees FHLBs, will propose a rule to force many banks to hold 10% of their assets in mortgage loans to maintain access to the FHLBs. The regulator is also exploring new guardrails for lending money to troubled institutions and tougher stress tests.

        A big structural overhaul may also be in the offing: The regulator is looking at consolidating some of the 11 FHLBs scattered across the country. The FHFA didn’t say which of the institutions could be on the chopping block. Sandra Thompson, who runs the agency, could slash the number to eight without any involvement from Congress.

        “The FHLBs have always had as a part of their mission providing general liquidity, and that’s not going to change,” Joshua Stallings, the FHFA deputy director who oversees the FHLB system, said in an interview. “But the fact of the matter is that we have to ensure the Federal Home Loan Banks are operating in a safe and sound manner. They have to do a better job.”
        Some changes would require congressional action. Officials will ask lawmakers for help to rein in “elevated compensation” for some FHLB executives and to “at least” double the amount of profit that the FHLB system must spend on affordable housing.

        The chief executives of FHLBs typically earn well over $1 million annually, and average pay per employee can rival that of Wall Street banks. Last year, the average compensation and benefit expense per employee at the FHLB in San Francisco was in line with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. at more than $310,000 per year, according to regulatory filings.

        The FHLBs were set up in the Great Depression to boost mortgage lending, but have since morphed into a financial backstop for banks and credit unions. At the same time, their importance in housing finance has declined as nonbank mortgage firms grew to predominate home lending.
        “There’s a culture shift that’s going to be needed in the banks,” Stallings, the FHFA official, said. “That’s going to need to change from being passive liquidity providers to being active supporters of housing and community development.”

        The FHFA found that in March some large, troubled institutions had become so reliant on borrowing from the FHLBs that they hadn’t set up the ability to borrow from the Fed’s discount window. In one week in March, the FHLBs funded $676 billion in loans, a record, the report found.
        Going forward, “there are going to be times when a Federal Home Loan Bank will need to work with the appropriate Federal Reserve Bank to ensure borrowing can be moved over,” Stallings said.

        1. Thanks for the full article. FHLB is America’s appendix. Usually ignored. No longer necessary. Could give you one heck of a problem some day. (You heard that here first.)

          Brookings and Wellington both looked at the FHLB. Brookings lays out the risks. Wellington explains how insurers can game the system. (The Bloomberg article entirely missed insurers. Wellington notes that 25+ insurers join the system every year.) After reading the articles, I added the FHLBs to my “next shoe to fall” list along with insurance companies owned by private equity. Some key points:

          — The FHLB’s original mission of facilitating mortgages during the Depression era has faded over time. Brookings: the FHLB has no longer has a “well-articulated contemporary purpose.” Wellington: “FHL Banks do not restrict how their members use advances.”
          — “Is you is, or is you ain’t?” As public-private hybrids, FHLBs get a higher rating from the ratings agencies and borrow at more favorable rates. A line of credit from the Treasury, a Fed backstop and status on a par with US Treasuries will take you a long way.
          — FHLBs are privately owned with boards controlled by bank and insurance company members. A potential conflict of interest with their original public mission.
          — FLLBs borrow long and loan short to their members. A risky business in general and a playground for FHLB members who want to play the arb game.
          — FHLB paper is found in government Money Market Funds
          — As many rate shoppers (like me) realize, FHLBs are large and active borrowers. There’s a lot of dry kindling waiting for a careless camper to drop a match.

          Article links below. JMO. DYODD.

          The title says it all: “Loans from Federal Home Loan Banks: An opportunity for US insurers to enhance investment yield and total return.”

          “As of 31 March 2023, 564 insurance companies were members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank or FHLB) system and had borrowed over US$143 billion from it year to date.”

          “Adding to its appeal, FHLB debt may receive favorable treatment as operating leverage by ratings agencies.”
          “How to limit the risks to financial stability posed by the Federal Home Loan Bank System”

          “…their current business model of borrowing extensively in short-term funding markets and providing longer-term funding to their depository institution and insurance company members carries risks for the financial system”

          “FHLB debt may be purchased on the open market by the Federal Reserve. FHLB debt has privileged regulatory status in the portfolios of commercial banks and credit unions, and is treated as government debt for purposes of the securities laws. “

          1. Backwards? :
            ” FLLBs borrow long and loan short to their members. A risky business in general and a playground for FHLB members who want to play the arb game.”
            vs- theirs:
            “…their current business model of borrowing extensively in short-term funding markets and providing longer-term funding to their depository institution and insurance company members carries risks for the financial system”

            Private banks?- hmm.

    1. I can’t access your article (paywall) , so I don’t know who they’re after, but I thought I saw some recent reports of hedgies and PE types using captive banks for speculation with cheap FHLB money. They win, they profit. They lose, the FDIC and the taxpayers pick it up.

      Jeff — * “There are two kinds of graft that ought to be wiped out by law. I mean Wall Street speculation, and burglary.”
      Narrator — “Nearly everybody will agree with you as to one of them,” I said with a laugh.
      Jeff – “Well, burglary ought to be wiped out, too.”
      – O. Henry, short story, 1910

      1. This was a first for me to try this on a cell phone. I read the article and it’s a lot of talking and a good outline of what needs to be done. Will it happen? And if so how long will it take and how much would get watered down?
        The clock is ticking with less than 5 months to March and it’s my understanding that the loans banks took out at the fed discount window will have to be paid back or rolled over. If this is part of the plan to replace that borrowing they better hurry up unless I misunderstood.

  24. Bankruptcy…

    WeWork files bankruptcy…landlords & commercial real estate firms stuck with empty buildings & losses…

  25. Wilson,

    Only a guess. Some of the selling pressure may have come from some investors seeing the new ET-I shares show up in their accounts, in place of their CEQP- shares. When they saw the new position, they sold.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *